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They were bloody clashes but ... in the context of the
time and the circumstances in that part of the world,
they were relatively minor. Fighting was an absolutely
common feature there every weekend without exception...
Periodically these became more serious... instead of one or
two murders, there'd be say, half a dozen, perhaps even
more. But the violence was not exceptional.. .This was the
normal feature of life in Sophiatown and particularly in
Newclare...Newclare was a yery tough area and like any
slum ... you accept that there is violence constantly ... One
must ... C.also3 ... remember that rioting and fighting was
a form of amusement ... Young people stiff with boredom. 1
This was the judgement of W.J.P. Carr, former Manager of the Non-
European Affairs Department of the Johannesburg City Council, when
asked about the violence in Newclare during the 1940s and 50s. Yet,
in 1952, this "relatively minor" type of clash erupted into one of
the largest suburbian squatter movements that Johannesburg has ever
experienced. Not only did some 300 African families move across the
railway line to Northern Newclare to squat on Council-owned land, but
they remained there for seven months while the Johannesburg City
Council and the Central Government deliberated on ways of removing
them.
Unlike the squatter settlements which sprang up around
Johannesburg during the mid-1940s in protest to the shortage of
housing and the Johannesburg City Council's apparent inertia to
alleviate the situation, the Newclare squatters movement flowed out
of a violent clash within the community itself. While officialdom
viewed this as yet another inter-tribal conflict (which could later
be used by Apartheid apologists and ideologues to justify ethnic
segregation), the movement highlighted the underlying tensions and
forces which were operating beneath the surface to shape this
community. By 1952, Newclare had become an increasingly volatile
area with tensions often expressing themselves in the form of
unbridled violence and anti-social crime. Far from being a united
and closely 2knit community as has often been suggested by people like
Don Mattera , Newclare's proletariat and lumpen-proletariat were
divided into various groupings including vigilance organizations and
gangsters. During the early 1950s two distinct sections falling into
the latter categories could be distinguished: the Ama-Rashea, a group
(* I am most grateful to Greg Cuthbertson, Albert Grundlingh,
Hilary Sapire and Jane Carruthers for their valuable
comments on earlier drafts of this paper.)
1. Interview with W.J.P. Carr, 7 December 1988.
2. Don Mattera, "Sophiatown" in D. Ricci ( e d . ) , Reef of Time,
(Johannesburg, 1986), p. 209, and Don Mattera, "Sophiatown: The
New Political Frontiers", Talk given to African Studies Forum,
UNISA, 5 April 1989.
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of 3asotho migrants who came to regard Newclare as its stronghold,
and the Civic Guards, a vigilance committee who tended to rally large
sections of the population there behind them , since they offered
some protection against the gangster element.
Up until recently, gangsterism and anti-social crime has been a
subject ignored in South Africa's historical literature. Apart from
Van Onselen's two-volume work which gave exposure to the gangs which
emerged out of various social transformations accompanying the
industrial revolution on the Rand, much of the literature during
the 1970s and early 1980s has ignored the important role which gangs
and anti-soqial crime played in community struggles and black
resistance. This gap is however gradually being plugged by a whole
body of literature which situates township gangs and "Tsotsis" firmly
within the proletarianization process. Attention is also given here
to the ways in which gangs form, the elements which bind them
together and the notion of a "gang culture".
Don Pinnock's pionering study on the gangs which formed in Cape
Town's predominantly "coloured" districts, has seen gangsterism in
the South African context as emerging not only out of the development
of Apartheid but also out of the various problems experienced by the
working class. These include the fear of dispossession, violence
and death. He shows how, for example, the state through a
deliberate policy of social enginering, implemented the Group Areas
Act which broke down the long established forms of social control. A
natural outgrowth of this situation was the emergence of ganging,
through which Cape Town's youth and working classes could build up
new networks of associations and resort to whatever means guarenteed
survi val.
The work done on gangs on the Reef Townships tends to highlight the
ways in which Pinnock's findings dealing with the Cape gangs can be
applied to the Johannesburg context. Clive Glazer for example, has
also shown how, through an appreciation of certain styles and
rituals, working class subcultures such as the Tsotsi youth gangs on
the Rand, challenge working class problems such as the exclusion from
political power structures, low pay, unemployment, lack of property-
ownership and overcrowded living conditions.
C. Van Onselen, New Babylon and New Nineveh: Studies in the
Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand 1886-1914,
2 volumes, (Johannesburg, 1982). The works which ignore the role
of gangs in black resistance are those which deal with more
institutional forms of protest such as Peter Walshe's The Rise of
African Nationalism in South Africa, (Cape Town, 1987 e d . ) .
Literature on the Western Areas in particular ignoring gangsterism
are the articles by Deborah Hart and Gordon Pirie, "The Sight and
Soul of Sophiatown" in Geographical Review, vol. 74, No. 1,
January 1984, and "The Transformation of Johannesburg's Black
Western Areas" in Journal of Urban History, vol. II, No. 4,
August 1985.
D. Pinnock, The Brotherhoods: Street Gangs and State Control
in Cape Towni (Cape Town, 1984).
C. Glazer, "Anti-Social Bandits: Culture, Hegemony
and the Tsotsi Subculture on the Witwatersrand
during the 1940s and 1950s", Paper presented to a Wits MA
Seminar, August 1988, and "Students, Tsotsis and the
Congress Youth League: Youth Organization on the Rand in
the 1940s and 1950s", Paper presented to the History
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In a sense, gangsterism is thus a way in which a rightless group
can assert its identity and respond to its position under
oppression. Unfortunately the literature on the Ama-Rashea gangs and
the Civic Guard movement, is rather sparse, but as this paper will
show, they too fit into the scenarios painted by Pinnock and Glazer.
Both factions were representative of the different methods employed
by Africans to survive in a hostile urban environment where
everything was pitted against them. During the period under
review, basic social amenities for the still ever-increasing African
urban population were still inadequate. Poverty had risen
dramatically in Newclare and the lack of housing with its resultant
overcrowding tended to exacerbate misery and tension. Here, as in
other townships there were various responses to these social evils.
Illicit brewing, prostitution, hawking, gambling and gangsterism
were all facets, albeit illegal ones, of the struggle to survive in
the cities. The Newclare squatting movement emphasised these
survival strategies.
While much of the literature on squatting has focused on the
larger, mope organised and more widely publicised squatting
movements, such as those which emerged in Orlando during the
1940s, Durban during the 1940s and 50s and Crossroads during the
1970s and 80s, the Newclare squatters movement of 1952 has gone
virtually unnoticed by historians. Yet it was a movement of
considerable significance.
While the origins of this squatter movement differed from similar
movements in the past (such as those which sprang up in Orlando,
Pimville and Alexandra in the period 1944-46 in response to the
massive housing shortage which could not be alleviated by the
Johannesburg City Council), the ways in which the squatter community
organised itself was based on a set of political practises, the
core components of which were generated by other such settlements
during the 1940s. The nature of these political practises - the
rudimentary policing of the squatter camp by members of the
settlement, the election or self- appointment of representative
leaders, the illicit brewing and selling of alcohol and the
reliance on the law to plead their case - were all elucidated in a
recent paper by Phillip Bonner, and on closer comparison, the
ties between the Newclare movement and those of the past are quite
evident since the Newclare squatter's movement organised itself
exactly along these lines.
Another reason why the Newclare squatters movement proved
significant in the history of the Newclare township, was that it
Workshop of the University of the Witwatersrand, February
1987.
See for example Alf Stadler, "Birds in the Cornfields:
squatter movements in Johannesburg, 1944-47" in B. Bozzoli
(ed.j, Townships and Protest: Studies in the Social History
of the Witwatersrand, (Johannesburg, 1 9 7 9 ) , pp. 19-48, Paul
Maylam, "The "Black Belt": African Squatters in Durban
1935-1950" in Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol. 17,
no. 3, 1983, and Josette Cole, Crossroads: The politics of
Reform 1976-1986, (Johannesburg, 1987).
P. Bonner, "The Politics of Black Squatter Movements on the
Rand, 1944-1952", Paper presented to the 12th Biennial
Conference of the South African Historical Society,
University of Natal, Pieterinaritzburg, January 1989.
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tended to fuel the fires of the Western Areas Removal Scheme. The
continuing controversy over possible solutions to the squatting
problem and the fact that it dragged on for no less than seven
months, provided H.F. Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs at that
time, with enough propaganda needed to argue the case in favour of
the complete removal of the Western Areas of Johannesburg. Apart from
this, the movement also
proved crucial in conditioning the relationship between Verwoerd and
the Johannesburg City Council. Its role in determining the nature of
Verwoerd's strategy in dealing with a recalcitrant City Council which
was rather reluctant to remove the squatters and place them in the
already overcrowded Moroka emergency camp, cannot be underestimated.
In this instance, as with trying to get the Council to cooperate with
the Resettlement Board in 1954 the threat to withhold all future
funds from the Council, became an integral part of Counci1-Verwoerd
pol itics.
This paper is an attempt to explore and analyse not only the nature
of the Newclare squatters movement by showing how it fed into the
Western Areas Removal scheme, but also to examine some aspects of the
Newclare community itself during the early 1950s in the period prior
to removal. By looking at Newclare a greater understanding can be
had of how certain sections of the working class reacted to its
environment and how its actions helped shape their community. What
follows therefore is not only an exploration of how the clash between
different sections of the Newclare community led to a squatting
movement of some magnitude, but also attempts to look behind the
scenes to see in what ways it served to determine and mould
governmental and Council policy vis-a-vis the destruction of
Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare.
THE NATURE OF THE NEWCLARE COMMUNITY 3Y 1952
Like Sophiatown, Newclare formed part of the farm Waterval 10 and
was surveyed as a site for a future ."non-European" township as early
as 1905. In 1912 Newclare received official muncipal regognition
with the sole intention that it would become an area for "Coloured"
occupation only. By 1949 the township was however proclaimed under
section 8 (1) of Act no. 25 of 1945, as an area predominantly
occupied by Africans. In fact, by 1950 Newclare's African population
totalled 14 561 while its "Coloured" population totalled only
1 0 6 9 . 8
Although it was inextricably part of the Western Areas of
Johannesburg which also consisted of Sophiatown, Martindale and
Western Native Township, Newclare had its own distinct character.
Unlike Sophiatown with its more heterogenous class composition
Newclare's population was predominantly working class: 552 were
labourers (mainly on the mines close to the township), and 2)% were
factory workers. The rest of the population consisted of
washerwomen, domestic workers, craftsmen and the unemployed. (See
Appendix A)
As a result of the low earning power of its population, coupled
8. City of Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Department, Survey
of the Western Areas of Johannesburg, 1950. Copy housed in
Municipal Library Johannesburg, p. 26. (Hereafter referred to as
Survey. )
9. Ibid, p.50.
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with a drastic rise in population during the 1940s due to the steady
stream of migrant workers and their families into Johannesburg-.
Newclare rapidly developed into a worse slum than Sophiatown. In
1950 housing conditions there were rated as of a much lower standard
than in Martindale and Sophiatown. (See Appendix B) It was estimated
that an average of seven families occupied each stand. A survey
undertaken by the Non-Eurpoean Affairs Department of the Johannesburg
City Council in 1950 showed that the 579 stands in Newclare
(averaging a size ,Qf 50ft x 100ft) supported a population of no
fewer than 16 980. This meant an average of 29 people per stand.
Most African home-owners who had to pay off their bonds could not do
so without taking in tenants and letting every possible room in the
house. Because these owners were hamstrung by high bond rates and
exorbitant sewerage fees, money was not freely available and tenancy
proved to be the only viable solution. This resulted in extremely
unhealthy and crowded living conditions. Rows of four and sometimes
six rooms, individual shacks made out of wood, zinc and hessian and
double rows of rooms (making.back to back letting possible) were
built on almost every stand.
As in the case of Sophiatown, the only evidence that can be relied
on to give some indication of life and conditions in Newclare are the
accounts given in the literature of the period which are often
romanticised, Trevor Huddleston's descriptions in Naught for Your
Comfort and various oral testimonies. Of these sources, two
particular vignettes stand out:
...a different atmosphere hangs like the smoke from its
thousand braziers over the squalid houses and over the
"smart" homes which stand side by side in its unplanned
and unchartered streets. You can go down any street in
Newclare and suddenly without warning and without reason,
find it has petered out into a field, grimy and grey...
Or you can walk down a narrow alley between houses and
discover an open yard, with a row of rooms facing it,
doors open or half shuttered with old packing-cases to
keep the children in, a single latrine, a single tap, and
twenty families making their own community in that narrow
plot.13
and
The open coal brazier was an inextricable part of life
in Newclare...To visit Newclare at sunset was like enter-
ing a city on fire. A thick cloud of smoke from an
interminable line of open braziers, planted at short
intervals in front of the hovels, hung over the township
at that hour. They were not bothered by the obsession
10. In 1937 the number of families living in Newclare numbered 1 691
and by 1950, this number had risen to 4 609 which meant that an
average of 224 families were moving into the area every year.
Ibid. p. 9.
11. Ibid, p. 27.
12. City of Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Department, Report on a
Sample Survey of the Native Population residing in the Western
Areas of Johannesburg, 1951, p.15.(Hereafter referred to as Sample
Survey. )
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with air pollution those people. For them necessity
dictated that it was more expedient to fill the chests
of all with smoke fumes than go hungry for lack of
somewhere to cook, or be cold in winter...It was...
also ...the meeting place of urchins who sought the
freedom the street offered from the imprisonment of
one-room houses in the evening...14
Since Newclare formed part of the urban environment, it was also
beset by similar problems facing other African townships.
Constant liquour and pass raids, strenuous attempts at influx control
and constant police harassment created a potential cauldron of
discontent which was worsened by rumours of impending removal to
Meadowlands. Liquor raids in particular, generated a great deal of
animosity towards the police. In Newclare. brewing was the most
common source of an additional income and was far more prevalent
than in Sophiatown and undertaken on practically every stand.
The result was that the number of shebeens in Newclare was higher
than in Sophiatown and hence, police raids occurred more frequently.
During January and February 1950, numerous raids took place in
Newclare. On 30 January 500 police entered the township and arrested
650 Africans of whom 175 appeared in court charged under the pass
and liquor laws. On 15 February 250 Africans were again detained by
police in another raid,on similar charges.
The Result of this discontent was that by 1950 the black working
class openly started to reveal its opposition,, and tensions exploded
in uprisings all over the Rand. Newclare was no exception and in
fact proved to be an explosive political force. Prior to 1950,
uprisings as a result of the proposed increase in tram fares, minor
clashes between residents of the Western Areas and the white
residents of the surrounding suburbs and various gang fights had
taken place. In 1950 another riot was sparked off in the area by the
attempted arrest of an African for being in possession of liquor
illegally. The arrest was thwarted by a crowd which soon gathered and
when police called for reinforcements the crowd retaliated with
stone-throwing. Although it seemed a relatively minor skirmish
between residents and the police, the Commission of Inquiry which was
set up to investigate into this and other riots on the Rand, found
other underlying causative factors. These had built up over a long
period. Despite the Communist bogey which was held responsible for
any political riot which occurred in South Africa at the time, it was
antagonism to White Government on account of its strong heavy-handed
control over all aspects of African's lives and strong anti-police
feelings aroused by their role as government agents, which was cited
as the major cause.
The nature of Urban Administration was also an area which elicited
discontent, especially owing to Advisory Board elections, Lodgers'
permits and the inefficient bureaucratic nature of Location
13. T. Huddleston, Naught for Your Comfort, (Glasgow, 1981 ed.)
p. 76.
14. M. Moteane, "The Russians are Coming" in Chi ldren of the
Twi1ight, (Johannesburg, 1987), p. 137.
15. Sample Survey, p. 13.
16. The Star, 30 and 31 January 1950 and The Rand Daily Mai 1, 15
February 1950.
17. These permits were however not rigidly enforced in the Western
Administration. Other less important and perhaps more questionable
causes of township unrest were cited too. These included the
influence of bioscope films, public utterances and statements in the
press, intimidation, residential admixture of races and the "Tsotsis 1
Reign of Terror" in the townships.
What is revealing, is the Commission's view that much trouble
was being created by Tsotsi gangsters. Newclare in this respect was
no different from other townships but again, it was to be its
distinctive type of gangster that distinguished it from Sophiatown
and Martindale. Whereas the latter areas were occupied by the
"Americans" and "Berliners", Tsotsi groups fashioned along Western
lines and who wore "American clothes, like Palm Beach, Palm Dale,
Magregoc shirts, Magregor trousers, Florsheims, °and@ Stetson
hats," T y
Newclare was home to the Ama-Rashea or Russian gang. The early
history of this gang is not well documented but it would seem that it
first arose during the late 1920s as vigilance societies organised by
members of different ethnic groups. By the late 1940s they had
however transformed themselves into fierce social predators who
preyed unhindered on township residents,^naming themselves after the
Russian victors in the Second World War. Anthony Sampson regarded
this group as the most sinister and notorious of the Johannesburg
gangs:
Unlike others, they were strongly tribal in origin; they
were all Basutos, and had come from the poor, proud
independence of Basutoland to the slum township of Newclare,
near Sophiatown. Their uniform symbolised their predicament;
they wore expensive gaberdine trousers and smart hats; but
in the place of coats, they wore large blankets draped round
them, defiant in their very design. A favourite pattern
showed British fighter planes and bombs revolving round a
crown, with "V" for Victoria, the great white Queen. The
stately blanketed figures walked gravely up and down the
slimy streets of Newclare, their tribal dignity still about
them. 21
Like most working class sub-cultures which emerge as a response to
the contradictions which develop in the hegemonic culture, the Ama-
Rashea proved to be a distinct response to material conditions in
Areas, having been relaxed by the City Council during the 1940s
as a result of the housing shortage. See City of Johannesburg,
Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department,
For the period December 1944 to 30 June 1948, p. 5. (Hereafter
referred to as NEAD Report.)
18. Union of South Africa, Report of the Commission Appointed
to Enquire into Acts of Violence Committed by Natives at
Krugersdorp, Newlands, Randfontein and Newclare, U.G.
47/1950, pp. 9-12.
19. Kort Boy in an interview conducted by the Junction Avenue
Theatre Company and reproduced in P. Stein and R. Jacobsin
(eds.), Sophiatown Speaks, (Johannesburg, 1986), p. 67.
20. David Coplan, In Township Tonight: South Africa's Black
City Music and~Theatre, (Johannesburg, 1985), p. 101.
21. A. Sampson, Drum: A Venture into the New Africa, (London,
1956), p.109-110.
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Newclare and other Reef townships and the various contradictions
posed by industrial development on the Rand. Faced by exclusion
from political power structures, lack of property-ownership low wages
and high rates of unemployment, life in the urban areas proved to be
unstable and insecure. These problems were exacerbated by intense
pressure and competition for every kind of urban service and
resource. While the African urban population doubled between 1937
and 1952, housing remained scarce and at a premium. All this created
a social situation in the urban residential areas characterised by
extreme poverty and misery amongst the African proletarian
population. Many were forced to resort to whatever means they could
in order to survive. Gangsterism was thus but one symptom of the
negative social forces at work in the cities and can be regarded as
part of what can be termed, a culture of survival.
During the 1940s and 1950s, gangs became an important feature of
urban township life. The freehold areas of Sophiatown, Martindale and
Newclare proved to be a haven for gangsters. Apart from the the rich
shebeen and Marabi culture, these areas were free from Council
administration which made the policing of these areas more difficult.
Hence both survival and prosperity was made easier. Many of these
gangs had different aims, strategies and characteristics. While some
were organised along age lines like Don Mattera's "Vultures", some
were more overtly ethnic in character like the Ama-Rashea. The most
notable feature of this latter group was that it was an organisation
of Basotho migrant workers seeking employment on the Rand. Their
response to the alienating experience of urban life was to organise
themselves into gangs based on their common historical and
"traditional" background. My interpretation of the Russians has
relied heavily on the arguments of Belinda Bozzoli. She has shown
for example, that although the process of proletarianization has
varied from region to region, the arrival of groups of migrant
workers from particular areas^such as the British protectorates, has
often occurred in "cohorts". The Russian gang which was
essentially made up of Basotho migrants, tends to support this
position, since they tended not only to ignore other ethnic groupings,
but identified themselves according to their village of origin and
based their fighting units firmly on their village identity.
Bozzoli further argues that "in the case of gangsters on the Rand,
being a Basotho and being a gangster were coinciding points of
22. In 1937 the population of the Western Areas of Johannesburg
(Sophiatown, Martindale, Newclare and Western Native Township)
stood at 35 150, but by 1950 this number had risen to 66 577.
This resulted in a great housing shortage which the
Johannesburg City Council could not alleviate. A NEAD survey in
1946 revealed that in Johannesburg, 40 000 families needed
accommodation and that in 1948 this number would increase to
62 000. Nead Report, p.4.
23. Belinda Bozzoli (ed. ), Introduction to Class, Community and
Conflict: South African Perspectives, (Johannesburg, 198777 p.
23.
24. Jonathan Clegg in his article "Ukubuyisa Isidumbu - Bringing back
the body: An Examination into the Ideology of Vengeance in the
Msinga and Mpofana Rural Locations 1882-1944" in P. Bonner (ed.),
Working Papers in Southern African Studies Vol. 11, has
identified similar trends amongst different groupings in the
Zululand region.
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identity which served, perhaps to distinguish the migrant worker from
his urban counterpart". In this respect, what she has stated about
the adoption of an identifiable set of motifs by a particular group
of people with similar societal and cultural experiences, also
rings true of the Russians. It can be argued that their brightly
coloured blankets was an emblem, a popular motif, signifying their
ethnicity, and providing a way of negotiating an identity and a means
of providing collective security.
While the "Russians" shared a common historical and "traditional"
background, they were far from a united entity and during the early
1950s two distinct factions emerged: the Matsieng and the Ha
Mo lapo. It was these two factions which began to carve up the
African locations of the Reef into separate spheres of influence,
with the Matsieng led by S.S. Hlalele gaining dominance over and
establishing its headquarters in Newclare. This division often
resulted in the flaring up of so-called "faction fights" stretching
all over the Rand from the Western Areas of Johannesburg to B e n o n i ,
Germiston and Evaton. Bonner has seen these conflicts as reflecting
the deprivation of African working class life on the Witwatersrand
with its urgent quest to secure and control the barest necessities
of life, such as employment and housing in a situation where
these resources were in desperately short supply. Ironically, this
competition manifested itself in the use of extreme violence which
added to the harsh existence of many urban Africans. Often surging
through Newclare extorting considerable sums of money on the pretext
of offering physical protection {"We fight while you are a s l e e o g
We fight with our enemies and thus it is you we are fighting for" ) ,
"the Matsieng instilled fear into the hearts and minds of ordinary
township residents:
25. Bozzoli, Class, Community and Conflict, p.24.
26. Ibid. p.12.
27. These two factions reflected divisions within Sotho society
itself. Matsieng was an area in Central Lesotho originally ruled
by Moshoeshoe I's son, Letsie. Ha Molapo on the other hand, was
an area in North East Lesotho and was ruled by his other son
Molapo. The constant rivalry between these two princes forms a
dominant theme in Sotho history. The rivalry in the Ama-Rashea
which resulted in the split into the above-mentioned groups
reportedly started because of a quarrel over a woman, but at the
same time reflected the basic divisions within traditional Sotho
Society. See J. Guy and M. Thabane, "The Ma-Rashea: A
Participant's Perspective" in B. Bozzoli, C l a s s , Community and
Conf1ict, p. 446.
28. P. Bonner and R. Lambert, "Batons and bare heads: The
Strike at Amato Textiles, February 1958", in S. Marks and
S. Trapido ( e d s . ) , The Politics of Race, Class &
Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa, O-ondon,
19 8 7 ) , p. 344.
29. Johannes Rantoa, ex-Russian gang member in an interview
with the Oral History Project of the Institute of Southern
African Studies at the National University of Lesotho.
Reproduced in J. Guy and M. Thabane's article, "The Ma-
Rashea: A Participant's Perspective" in B. Bozzoli ( e d . ) ,
Class Community and Conflict, p. 455.
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...We came to associate the name "Russians" with
violence. They would descend on the township in great
battalions, clad in brightly coloured blankets, pants
belted high, white shoes and the inevitable stick which
was a deadly weapon in the hands of a Masotho...If you
heard a whistle blow, you had to clear off the streets if
you valued your life. They were insanely brave, those
"Russians". It seemed to them violence was just a game.30
Since they fell outside of the sphere of organised gangster and crime
syndicates, other tsotsis feared them too:
Funnily enough, the greatest obstacles to these gangs
is the behaviour of the "Russians" - the Basuto groups
that will not combine with them, but often without
warning attack them with sticks. The joke is that these
"Russian" gangs are not primarily interested in organised
crime. They do not care much for robbery and theft.
They are just thugs that make life tough for ordinary
people and gangsters alike...the "Russians" are an inde-
pendent lot, yery tribal, very proud. They resent being
classed with the "tsotsis" and they prefer to beat them
from the streets.31
In response to the ruthless grip exercised by the Matsieng faction
over Newclare, a counter group emerged organised along the lines of a
neighbourhood watch. Known as the "Civic Guards", they dedicated
themselves to offering protection to all the residents in Newclare
North by arming themselves with heavy sticks and patrolling the
township at night, especially on weekends. It is difficult to gauge
the Civic Guard's class and social character, as the only evidence
which exists on this group are scattered newspaper articles and
passing reference in Council and Advisory Board Minutes.
Nevertheless, existing evidence does reveal that members of this
movement were predominantly residents of Newclare, including
property-owners, tenants as well~as sub-tenants who were essentially
opposed to the "tsotsi" element. This so-called guard movement
was not an entirely new phenomenon and had already emerged during the
war years in many urban townships. There is also substantial evidence
to show that it had in fact been quite successful in combatting
township crime. One example is a statement made by one of the
members of the Jabavu Advisory Board, who said that by the beginning
of 1952 there were no "tsotsis" in his area due to the activities of
the "Civic Guards". In many respects the Civic Guard had certain
advantages over the police as they often knew the gangsters and could
therefore track them down to their homes. In March 1952 the
Guardian also reported that "where previously in North Newclare there
30. M. Melamu, "The Russians are Coming", p. 139.
31. "Organised Gangsterism", Drum, December 1955, p.29.
32. See Kathleen Vundla, PQ: The Story of Philip Vundla of South
Africa, (Johannesburg, 1973), pp. 30-31.
33. Intermediary Archives Depot, Johannesburg, West Rand
Administration Board Archive (IAD W R A B ) , file no. 351/1
vol. 1, Extract from the Jabavu Advisory Board Minutes, 8
September, 1955.
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was an average of ten rape cases on a Monday Morning and two or three
corpses, since the coming.of the Civic Guard there have hardly been
any crimes of violence." W.J.P. Carr,
Manager of the Non-European Affairs Department of the Johannesburg
City Council also spoke of how he encouraged the "Civic Guard" since
it was "controlling the indiscriminate roaming around of
criminals".
On numerous occasions between 1952 and 1953, the Guard movement
tried to get official recognition from the authorities whom they
hoped would supply them with at least one policeman to help them with
their reconnaissance in the townships. This recognition was,
however, not forthcoming. The police refused to ally themselves with
this movement at all. Two reasons for this have been advanced:
residents were unanimous in feeling that the success achieved by the
Guards in combatting crime and succeeding where the police had
failed, placed the latter in a rather precarious position as a so-
called law enforcement agency. The police could not acknowledge
their apparent weakness and therefore became rather envious of a
movement which had the support of the people. It seemed only
natural therefore that they should refuse to giwe such an
organisation official recognition and sanction. On the other hand,
the police viewpoint, expressed by Colonel J.C. Kriek, was that the
Civic Guard would inevitably be penetrated by criminal elements and
would degenerate into another "Native Gang", while at the same time
having leaders which were well-known Communists.
Despite all the animosity from official sources towards the Guard,
which eventually resulted in its banning in 1953, the movement
prospered but did not become a strong enough force to prevent the use
of strong-arm tactics by the "Russians". The latent tensions
between these two groups were openly revealed in March 1952 when
violent clashes broke out between them. By June conditions in
Newclare had become so bad that the residents from South Newclare, in
open revolt against the intimidation of the "Russians", moved from
their homes and trekked across the railway line to squat on
Counci1-owned land.
THE TREK ACROSS THE RAILWAY LINE
The violence which was to culminate in the Newclare squatting
movement had begun on the weekend of the 9th of March 1952.
Disturbances broke out on the Sunday morning when the Russians, who
had for weeks before started extorting money from the residents of
South Newclare, tried to cross the railway line to attack the Civic
Guard in Northern Newclare. The latter retaliated which resulted in
an escalating gang war. The next week saw sporadic clashes in which
nine Africans were killed and many more injured. Although the
police intervened, it seemed to many that they showed a more
favourable disposition towards the Russians than to the Civic
Guard.
34. The Guardian, 13 March 1952.
35. Interview with W.J.P. Carr, December 1988.
36. IAD WRAB, file no. 351/1 vol. 1, Extract from Jabavu
Advisory Board Minutes, 8 Sept. 1955.
37. The Guardian, 27 March 1952.
38. See The Guardian, 13 March 1952 and T. Huddleston,
Naught for Your Comfort, pp. 18-79. The question of police
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Still, the Russians had an intimate knowledge of the terrain and in
some cases managed to evade the police by hiding by day and prowling
at night. The tactics which they adopted were to round up citizens
late at night and during the early morning and forced the head of
each family to pay one pound "protection" money. They were joined by
the Basotho women who went about the township during the day
demanding five shillings from each woman they met and threatening
those who resisted with violence. The 1950 Survey showed that there
was a considerable number of Basotho women in Newclare who lived
either by themselves, or with a group of unrelated men andgthat apart
from brewing, these women had no legal means of support.
On the surface it seems that this extortion was simply a lumpen-
proletariat's response to unemployment, but Johannes Rantoa, an ex-
Russian, has a different explanation. While admitting that when
collecting this money "we did not ask for it nicely", he averred
that this money was needed for the largest item of Russian
expenditure - the Lawyers whom thew had to employ to defend their
members against state prosecution. This goes a long way to explain
the causes of the Newclare violence, which clearly grew out of the
exigencies of Russian life on the Rand. It was simply another facet
of the working class's response to the hardships imposed by urban
social control and the structures of domination. It was a struggle
rooted in the realities of urban life and not simply another
spontaneous flare up of "recreational violence" as Carr saw it.
THE WESTERN AREAS OF JOHANNESBURG
non-involvement was to be raised by many parties including
The Johannesburg City Council throughout 1952 and 1953.
39. Sample Survey, 1951, p. 19.
40. J. Guy and M. Thabane, "The Ama-Rashea, a Participant's
perspective", pp. 454-455.
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Nevertheless, the impact on the Newclare community was profound.
On the 23th May 1952, 300 African families hastily grabbed whatever
belongings they could, left their homes in Southern Newclare and
trekked across the railway line to find alternative accommodation in
the Northern areas of the suburb where Russian influence was
negligible. This was an entirely spontaneous movement and involved
the mass movement of property-owners, tenants and sub-tenants. For a
few weeks after the move, forty families squatted in the open on
Lot 99 (also known as Reno S q u a r e ) , a piece of vacant ground owned by
the Transvaal Provincial Administration while another forty families
squatted on neighbouring territory, stands 431 and 432. These
numbers swelled almost daily. By 19 June they had established about
100 dilapidated wood, iron, hessian and cardboard shelters and it
was also apparent that many more structures were in the process of
being built.
From the outset, conditions there were appalling. Without
sanitation, squatters were forced to get water from neighbouring
houses and to use any amenities available in nearby areas. By mid-
June the squatting had spread to the municipal park known as Charles
Phillip Square as well as to and stands 497 and 460. Soon these
areas were filled with refuse and waste water and a genuine fear
arose about the menace it posed to public health. With little
protection against the elements and the harsh winter climate, misery
and hardships became a feature of the Newclare Squatter camp:
The women have a hard time of it. They try to get some
order in the shacks, crowded with the articles they
saved from their homes before the Russians appeared.
Wardrobes, small miserable tables, basins, tins, shabby
suitcases, and dozens of small articles lie in con-
fusion all around them. They buy water at 1d. to 3d.
a bucket from the houses in the neighbourhood. They go to
these houses for their toilet...Misery everywhere.. .Six
days ago Katie Nonzwaye gave birth to a child in a shack.
She is weak. Katie lives with her husband and three
children in this shack....In every shack there is the
same story of degradation and misery. 42
These conditions provoked a massive outcry from both the press and
the clergy, especially from Trevor Huddleston. As Newclare's
shanty town grew steadily it became obvious that the Johannesburg
City Council would have to formulate a coherent and detailed policy
to deal with this squatting problem. But problem-solviny of this
nature was not one of the Council's strong points, as its dealings
with the housing shortage and the Moroka squatters clearly showed
during the 1940s. The response to the Newclare settlement was
also to be characterised by similar feelings of impotency which was
increased by the reluctance of the police to provide protection for
41. IAD WRA3, File no. 158/15, vol. 1, Letter from acting chief
Health Inspector, I.J. Distiller, to Deputy Medical Officer
of Health, 20 June 1952.
42. The Clarion, 26 June 1952.
43. See specifically Peter Wilkinson's paper, "A Place to live:
The Resolution of the African Housing Crisis in
Johannesburg, 1944-1954", paper presented to the African
Studies Seminar, 27 July 1981.
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the Newclare residents against the "Russian" menace.
THE MUNICIPAL RESPONSE
Really perturbed about the situation, W.J.P. Carr telephoned the
police who informed him that the squatters had already been
instructed to return home and had been offered police protection.
This offer was refused, presumably because of threats made by the
Russians. With great difficulty, Carr then managed to arrange a
meeting between the leaders of the two opposing factions in an effort
to quell the escalating violence in the area. The "Russian" group
was represented by Solomon Hlalele, Colley Seamantha and Edward
Mohale, while the Civic Guard group was represented by December
Madinyane, Ben Kenosi and John Ralintsi. Gideon Pott, agent for the
High Commission Territories was also present at this meeting. He was
asked to attend since it had been freely alleged that the Russians
were from Basotholand.
At the meeting Hlalele and Madinyane were informed that the
authorities were gravely concerned about the continuing violence and
prevailing lawlessness which was "severely hindering the social
progress of the African population in the city". Carr also stated
that their actions tended to give the "Native" population a
reputation for violence and-lawlessness and for forming and
maintaining criminal gangs. When asked about the causes of the
violence in Newclare, each leader simply blamed the other and Carr
therefore drew his own conclusions. Ignoring the deep underlying
causes of the violence which had not been thoroughly investigated,
Carr attributed the unrest to these two leaders whom he regarded as
being locked into a struggle for supremacy and control of the illicit
funds extorted from Newclare residents. His further response was to
write to the Deputy Commissioner of the South African Police,
suggesting that both leaders be arrestecj6and brought to trial on
grounds of public violence and rioting. This was however,
not done.
After this stalemate, the Non-European Affairs Committee debated at
length as to what policy should be adopted towards the squatters. The
main difficulty was that there was no alternative accommodation
available for them. In the interim period, many houses formerly
occupied by the refugees in South Newclare had been taken over by
members of the Russian gang as well as their families.
Forcible removal became regarded as the only option open to the
Council, but it felt that the courts would not grant an order for
the expulsion of the squatters, in the absence of some alternative
forms of accommodation. However, Brian Porter, the Town Clerk,
was of the opinion that it was possible under the Prevention of
Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 to take action against the African
families who were squatting illegally in Newclare. The Act provided
that whenever persons squatted on property either with or without
the owner's permission under conditions which threatened the health
and safety of the public generally, the magistrate could, after
44. IAD WRA3, File no. 158/15, vol. 1, Non-European Affairs
Department (NEAD) Report no 22/1952 of Manager of NEAD,
W.J.P. Carr to Non-European Affairs Committee for its
meeting of 26 June 1952.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
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consultation with the Local Authority grant orders to effect the
immediate removal of such persons, transfer them elsewhere aod
demolish any buildings or structures which they had erected.
The squatters were notified of Council intentions by means of
notices which were posted up all around the squatter settlement on 30
June 1952. These stated that if the squatters had not evacuated the
area by 3 July, the Council intended to make an application to the
Magistrate of Johannesburg for an order requiring tbeir removal and
their return to the areas from which they had come. The notice also
informed squatters that they were entitled to legal representation
before the Magistrate, either by members of the squatter's
community itself, or by an advocate.
On 29 of June, violent clashes between the Russians and the Civic
Guard had broken out again. More than 500 Africans clashed at
Westbury Bridge. Fourteen were seriously injured5gnd treated, at
the Coronation Hospital, mainly for head injuries. The Russians
were also involved in clashes in Germiston that same weekend, where
six Africans were killed. It was evident that their power was spread
over a wide geographical area. These clashes tended to give an air
of permanence to the Newclare squatter settlement, because
immediately afterwards, other members of the 242 families camped on
lot 99, began making improvements to their shacks. The number of
squatters now stood at 1 200.
That the Johannesburg City Council had no solution to the squatting
problem became glaringly obvious at a meeting of the Non-European
Affairs Committee on 2 July 1952. Attended by representatives of the
police, the Government and NEAD, Council members stated emphatically
that since the Council had no powers to solve this pressing problem,
the police should step in to remove the lawless element. They felt
that the Council was being blamed unnecessarily for neglect-p
accusations which should be laid at the door of the police.
Numerous examples were cited where the police had refused to act
against cases of intimidation, extortion and victimization of
Newclare residents. Councillor A. Cutter suggested that the root
cause of the Newclare problem lay in the inadequate protection
afforded by the police in the area. When he had visited the township
on 28 June he had seen 50 to 100 police at the Newlands police
station, but had observed only one African policeman between 9 and
11 am in South Newclare. The squatters had informed him that
gangsters had come into their houses, thrown furniture around and
had told them to vacate their premises. When asked if they had
complained to the police, he was told that tUe police had stood on
the street corners and had taken no notice.
It is very difficult to gauge the reasons for the apparent police
47. IAD WRAB, file no. 150/15, vol. 1, Letter to the Manager of
NEAD from the Town Clerk, 29 June 1951.
48. The Star, 30 June 1952
49. IAD WRAB, file no. 158/15, vol. 1, City of Johannesburg
Notice to Squatters at Newclare.
50. The Star and Die Transvaler, 30 June 1952.
51. The Rand Daily Mail, 1 July 1952.
52. IAD WRAB, file no. 158/15, vol. 1, Minutes of the special
meeting of the Non-European Affairs Committee in
conjunction with the General Purposes Committee, 2 July
1952, p. 3.
53. Ibid, p. 4.
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apathy. Trevor Huddleston saw in police reluctance to disarm the
Russians a deliberate state strategy of "divide and remove".
3y 1952 the Western Areas Removal scheme was finally crystallizing
into shape and the continued unrest and tension in Newclare could be
used as effective propaganda to provide ultimate justification for
removing these townships. Although this squatter movement was to
eventually feed into the removal scheme, it is rather difficult to
explain police action solely in terms of its being part of a general
conspiracy to promote pro-removal propaganda. Evidence which might
reveal possible links between the "Russians" and the police is
lacking and consequently an alternative explanation has to be
sought. Carr has perhaps given the most plausible answer to this
question. He has argued that there was only a very small police
contingent stationed in Western Native Township, and the only police
station was situated in Newlands. With limited forces at their
disposal and a vast area to 5cover, police power and influence was
therefore quite restricted.
Police reluctance to arrest the leaders involved in the Newclare
disturbances once again placed the ball firmly in the Council's
court. Calling for an emergency meeting of NEAC later in the
afternoon of 2 July, the Council decided to invoke the provisions of
the Illegal Squatting Act and ordered the population of plotg99 to
leave the area and return home by midnight of the same day. 3y 3
July, none of the 240 families had moved from their shanties in
accordance with Municipal demands and the Council promptly applied
to the Magistrates Court for an eviction order against the
fami1ies.
By 4 July 1952, it was clear that conditions in the squatter camp
had deteriorated rapidly. Sickness began to take its toll: 20
people were hospitalised for various ailments. Robert Mgojo,
secretary of the camp, felt that many more people were becoming ill
because of bad housing, over-population, inadequate sanitary and
cooking facilities, all of which favoured the rapid spread of
infection.
It was at this juncture that the Native Affairs Department (NAD)
under its minister, H.F. Verwoerd, became involved in the struggle
between the Council and the squatters. Representatives of NAD, the
Council and the police became locked in trilateral negotiations in an
attempt to find alternative accommodation for the squatters. The
Council realised that despite the court order, there were legal
barriers against demolition of shacks should the Council eventually
wish to forcibly remove the squatters. Shacks could not be
demolished without a court order which could only be obtained if it
could be proved that alternative accommodation existed. In an effort
to devise strategies to cope with the situation, a meeting was called
54. T. Huddleston, Naught for Your Comfort, p. 86. This view
was shared by one resident who even went as far as
likening the so-called alliance between "Russians" and
police with the use by the state of Witdoeke in the
Crossroads disturbances of 1986.She felt that many Russians
acted as spies for the police. Interview with Patricia
Moetapele, 1 July 1939.
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between the Council and officials from NAD on 8 July 1952.
At the meeting, representatives of NAD stated that Verwoerd was
more in favour of the squatters being removed to an alternative site
than their being forced to return to their homes in Newclare. He
intimated that under the proposed Native Services Levy Bill presently
before parliament, money would be made available to the Council for
an alternative Sjte and for the necessary services which would be
required there. The only land available to the Council was
an area called Vukuzenzele but this was earmarked for rehousing the
residents of the of the the Moroka Emergency camp who had waited for
Council housing since 1947. Carr therefore suggested that a start be
made with the Western Areas Removal Scheme { W . A . R . S . ) , since the
government had already allocated land in the Meadowlands area for the
rehousing of the Africans affected.
Most of the Councillors concurred with Carr's views and after
lengthy negotiations, it was finally decided by this meeting that
the squatters from Newclare would be removed as part of the Western
Areas Scheme, firstly to Moroka as a temporary measure and then
subsequently to Meadowlands. The cost of this removal would be
shared between the Council and NAD on an equal-basis and the police
would give the necessary assistance required. On the same day, the
eviction order was granted, which instructed all squatters to remove
themselves and their belongings from Northern Newclare by midnight on
10 July. According to this order, if the squatters refused to move
they would then^be forcibly removed by the City Council to the Moroka
Emergency Camp. Furthermore, the City Council was also granted
authorisation to demolish and r&tgove all structures which were
erected on the Newclare stands, 0
SQUATTER RESISTANCE TO REMOVAL
After the Council decision became known, the squatters, who had
refused to move, organised a petition to be presented to the Rand
division of the Supreme Court in order to prevent the Johannesburg
City Council from clearing them out of their temporary homes. The
chief applicant was December Valashiya Chlamini who assumed the
leadership role in the squatters camp. Not much is known about
Dhlamini except that he was one of the residents of Southern
Newclare and one of the Civic Guards. He became self-elected leader
of the squatters,once the movement got underway. Very much like
James Kpanza in 1944, he soon appointed two assistants, Manyabi
Moloi and Robert Radebe as secretary and treasurer respectively who
59. IAD WRAB, File no. 158/15. vol. 1, Notes of meeting held
between officials of the Government Department of Native
Affairs and officials of the Johannesburg City Council,
8 July 1952.
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collected money for the legal representation of the squatters in
court. During the court proceedings, the Counsel for the African
families said that the squatters were prepared to return to their
homes only on condition that they were afforded police protection
against the Russians. The result was a Court Order staying their
eviction from the camp and the granting of a rule nisi calling on the
Council to fshow cause why the eviction order should not be
cancel led.
On 31 July the Council resolved to oppose the applications of
Dhlamini in the Supreme Court. But this was to be unsuccessful.
When the case was heard in the Supreme Court on 18 August, the judge
set aside the rule for eviction of the squatters because of a "gross
irregularity" in the issue of the magisterial order compelling the
squatters to leave Newclare. The evidence placed before the
magistrate by the Council had been done so confidentially and
therefore it was not authorised in terms of the Illegal Squatting
Act. The squatters had had no opportunity of stating their own
case and denying the charges. A further irregularity was that the
magistrate had ordered the forcible removal of the squatters to
Moroka while the notice originally posted by the City Council at the
camp had stated its intention to return the squatters "from whence
they came". The final ruling was consequently that it was now up to
the Council to make a pew application for the eviction of the
squatters of Newclare. 0
The failure to take decisive action and find a practical solution
to the problem seemed to be a characteristic of the Johannesburg City
Council's approach to African housing and squatting in general. The
establishment of Moroka Emergency Camp in 1947 and the acceptance of
a policy of controlled squatting had provided the Council with a
temporary means of dealing with the squatter movements on the Rand,
at least during the late 1940s. However, by 1952, even these
temporary solutions were denied to it and therefore, as a last
resort, it sought actively to engage the aid of the Native Affairs
Department and Verwoerd in particular in its attempts to find a a way
of terminating the Newclare squatter's movement.
VERWOERD AMD THE REMOVAL OF THE NEWCLARE SQUATTERS
In an effort to bring the violence to an end and force the
squatters to return home, the Council appealed directly to Verwoerd
to use his power to have the ringleaders in the two factions
arrested. It did not wish to make fresh applications through the
courts and became convinced that the only path left open was to take
action against whoever was deemed responsible for the unrest. The
direct entrance of Verwoerd into the struggle between the Council and
the squatters ushered in a new, and certainly more decisive phase in
the history of Newclare township. Firmly dedicated to the
Stallardist principle that Africans could not have any political
rights or freehold tenure in the "white" urban areas, Verwoerd's role
in the social engineering phase during the 1950s designed to create
64. The Rand Daily Mail, 11 July 1952.
65. IAD WRAB, File no. 158/15 vol. 1, Report of the Acting Town
Clerk to the Non-European and Finance Committees. Joint
meeting 31 July 1952.
66. The Star, 18 August 1952 and The Rand Daily Mai 1,
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"apartheid" cities, was of paramount importance. After the passing
of the Group Areas Act in 1950, the touchstone of Apartheid, Verwoerd
was to be personally responsible for a whole string of legislation
which not only aimed at manipulating urban space so as to create
separate residential areas designated for occupation by specific
racial groups, but which gradually destroyed any existing rights
which Africans might have had in urban areas. A clear example of
this was the Western Areas Removal Scheme which he took over from the
Johannesburg City Council, refined and started to implement from
1951 onwards. The Newclare squatter movement therefore presented
Verwoerd with a perfect chance to actively intervene in the Western
Areas of Johannesburg in 1S52, to thereby make a preliminary attempt
to implement his more grandiose apartheid designs.
The meeting between a deputation from the City Council with the
Minister of the Native Affairs Department, Verwoerd, and the Minister
of Justice, C.R. Swart, took place on 6 September 1952, three months
after the squatters settled on the vacant stands in Northern
Newclare. The statements made by Verwoerd at this meeting tended in
the main to reveal not only his thoughts on the general state of the
Western Areas of Johannesburg and Newclare in particular, but also
his views on the ultimate objectives of total apartheid: separate
residential areas for Africans along ethnic lines in planned
townships, where full control over the urban African population
could be regained and manitained. This also revealed the extent to
which NAD was to be primarily motivated by the wide-scale political
mobilisation of the African urban population during the early 1950s.
Verwoerd in particular, considered that the urban areas were
a fruitful breeding ground for unrest, owing to the massive
uncontrolled influx of Africans into the towns and cities. For this
reason, his prime concern was not so much the settlement of disputes
between the Russians and the Civic Guard, but the fact that the
Council should do everything in its power to reassert its authority
in the region and undertake the removal of the squatters. His advice
therefore was that the Council make a new application to the Courts
for a removal order. In effect, this proposal meant an immediate
commencement on the clearance of all African residents as part and
parcel of the Western Areas Scheme. Verwoerd further stated that his
Department could not undertake the removal of the squatters itself
but was prepared to offer the Council loans from the 800 0Q0 pounds
set aside by the Government for the Western Areas Scheme.
In a subsequent statement to the press, Verwoerd went a step
further in pointing out that the only real solution to the Newclare
squatter problem was the removal of both South and North Newclare and
67. For a detailed discussion of Verwoerd's policies, see Alexander
Hepple, Verwoerd, (Penguin, 1967) and Henry Kenny, Architect of
Apartheid: H.F. Verwoerd - An Appraisal, {Johannesburg, 1980).
68. The evolution of the Western Areas Removal Scheme from the 1940s
through to the 1950s as well as Verwoerd's role in bringing the
scheme into fruition, will be explored in greater detail in my
thesis dealing with the Destruction of Sophiatown, Martindale
and Newclare.
69. IAD WRAB, File no. 158/15, vol. 1, Report of what trans-
pired at the meeting between a deputation from the
Johannesburg City Council and Verwoerd, contained in
Urgency Report no 31/1952 to Special Meeting of the NEAC,
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the rehousing of their inhabitants in more controlled and ethnically
planned townships. Not only did Verwoerd's statements to the press
elicit strong condemnation from the press and Anglican clergy, but it
also placed the Council in a rather difficult position. It was clear
that Verwoerd was trying to force the Council's hand to remove the
Newclare Community and thereby use squatting as a testing ground
for implementing the Western Areas Removal Scheme. The Council on the
other hand, in a display of open defiance against Verwoerd, cpgarded
his "solution " as far from satisfactory let alone feasible. Once
again, as during the late 1940s, its desperation to find a solution
to the squatting problems which beset the Rand, and this time to find
an alternative to Verwoerd's proposals, were mirrored in its
resolutions and its complete failure to implement them. On 11
September 1952 the Council resolved to declare the areas occupied by
the squatters in Newclare as emergency camps and that all possible
steps be taken to accelerate the solution of the Council's housing
shortage. The City Engineer was thus instructed to proceed
 71
immediately with a programme to provide 2 500 houses a year.
Verwoerd's immediate response to the Johannesburg City Council's
refusal to implement his proposals, was to blackmail the Council by
threatening to deny any future help and financial assistance to the
Council unless it accepted his proposals for dealing with the
Newclare squatters. This approach was to become a firm
characteristic in his dealings with the City Council, especially in
1954 when the Council decided to withhold all assistance from the
implementation of W.A.R.S.. Verwoerd's reaction was to threaten to
withhold all funds for any future Council African housing schemes and
to have the Resettlement Board designated as an urban Local
Authority. The Council's retort in 1952 ? 2was that the Minister's
actions were "childish" and irresponsible. Nevertheless, Verwoerd's
strong-arm tactics had the desired effect since they spearheaded the
Council's reconsideration of re-applying for an eviction order from
the Magistrate.
From October to November 1952, the Council set about collecting as
much information on the nature of the squatter community in Newclare
as possible which it could use to substantiate its appeal for an
eviction order in court. One of the most important pieces of
evidence was a letter from the Superintendent of Western Native
Township to the Manager of NEAD. In it he stated that on a visit
to the camp, he found that 17 new shacks were being erected, new
squatters were moving into the area and illicit liquor was being
brewed and sold in the squatter camp. At the same time December
Dhlamini had assumed a definite leadership role among the squatters
and had received money from new occupants as an entrance fee into
the squatters' camp. Additional periodic payments by way of a levy
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were also imposed on residents already living there. In October
it was also reported that he had informed squatters that he had been
authorised by the Council to not only control the camp but to collect
monies from the residents as well. This development highlights the
similarities between the internal political structure of the
Newclare squatter camp and squatter movements of the past,
especially that organised and led by James Mpanza and the Sofasonke
Party in 1944. They also imposed an entrance fee on squatters in the
Orlando squatter camp as well as a weekly levy for the right to
erect shelters from whatever materials were at hand.
Various Affidavits were consequently signed and posted around the
squatter's camp to inform the squatters of Council intentions, and to
prevent a recurrence of the failure of its earlier application for an
eviction order on the grounds of submitting confidential reports.
Carr's affidavit mentioned the complete absence of proper sanitary
and health facilities as a reason for wanting the eviction order:
In consequence of the lack of amenities, I am of the
opinion that the health of the squatters themselves and
the people in the vicinity is being seriously jeopardised,
with a consequential danger to health of the public
generally. A second serious defect lies in the complete
absence of ordinary control measures, as is customary in
a proclaimed Native Location. By this I mean that there
is virtually no control over trading, preparation of and
exposing of food for consumption and cleanly domestic
facilities, and the prevention of illicit sale of liquor
of all descriptions.73
On S December 1952 the Magistrate granted an eviction order stating
that he was satisfied that public health was being endangered and
removal of the squatters to Moroka was thus deemed necessary. On 17
December the removals started, thereby ending the troubled seven
months in the community since the squatting movement had begun but
not the controversy which was to rage over the removal of the entire
area just three years later. Although the eviction order was a
short victory for the Johannesburg City Council, the plight of the
shack-dwellers was not alleviated, even though their living
conditions were slightly improved at Moroka. In a move which was to
mirror National Party apartheid strategy in the removals to
Meadowlands, where in a deliberate policy of "divide and rule" the
three communities were broken up and housing policy was instituted
along ethnic lines, the Council destroyed the unity of the Newclare
squatters. On arriving at Moroka the squatters were not housed
together as a community but were situated amongst the Moroka
75. IAD WRAB, File no. 158/15, vol. 2, Sworn Affidavit by
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residents t h e m s e l v e s , including various Russian factions which were
already established there. The Council's obvious intention was to
break the existing power groupings forged in Newclare in an attempt
to enforce its own c o n t r o l . The process of community development
which took place among the squatters as a means of mutual protection
against the Russians was thus shattered and individuals were left
isolated and far more vulnerable to attack than they had been in
Newc lare.
CONCLUSION
The Newclare squatters' movement of 1952 was clearly an important
event in the history of Newclare township. It was catalytic in
shaping the removal policies towards this area, particularly after
1954. Considering that this township also formed a part of the
Western Areas of Johannesburg which was also earmarked for removal,
the reverberations from Newclare were felt throughout this larger
urban region. Here communities were riven by endemic upheavals
caused not only by social banditry but also the larger designs of
apartheid government.
The social fabric of Newclare and its internal struggles closely
resembled that of other African townships in South Africa. And like
Pinnock and Glazer, I have attempted to elucidate the particular
survival strategies and responses of various sections of the Newclare
community to similiar social, environmental and material conditions
experienced elsewhere. The main argument is that although the
squatter community was structurally similar to other movements in the
past, its origins were slightly different. Unlike movements which
grew almost exclusively out of housing shortages and influx control,
the Newclare squatters movement also had its genesis in the
widespread gang warfare of the "Russians", who exacted "protection"
payments from the hapless residents. But it must be pointed out that
gang development also had its roots in the lack of housing and
miserable conditions faced by the urban poor.
This article thus also challenges Anthony Sampson's assertion that
the Russian gangs were merely an "apparition of the antique
Africa", which fails to recognize the precise nature
of the struggle for survival in a hostile urban complex where jobs,
housing and livable salaries were at a premium. Naturally, the
outcome of such hardships were often brutal and dislocating; they
fractured township communities and created gangster impulses. Nowhere
is this more vivdly illustrated than in the Newclare squatters
movement, where ordinary residents became embroiled in conflict with
the Russians. They were forced to leave their homes and trek across
the railway line to squat on land ownned by the Johannesburg City
C o u n c i 1 .
Another important issue which has been raised in this article is
the question of police complicity in the disruption of Newclare
society. The police seemed ill-equipped and even reluctant to take
decisive action against the leaders of the Russian gangs, apparently
condoning their sorties in the township. The exact relationship
between the police and the Russians is rather difficult to fathom
however. Any suggestion of a formal alliance would be an
exaggeration, but the refusal to control the activities of these
79. Anthony Sampson, Drum, A Venture into the New Africa
p. 111.
Page 22
gangs in their attacks on the "Civic Guard" insinuates at least
cautious preference for the Russians. Owing to the inadequacy of
policing in Newclare, it is clear that the gangs themselves served as
informal agencies of social control in the community.
The third crucial point is the effect of Johannesburg City Council
intrusion in Newclare. Its particular role and style of intrusion,
is construed as being instigated by governmental pressure,
specifically that exerted by the Native Affairs Department under
Verwoerd. It is suggested here that the coupling of the Council and
NAD ushered in a new phase of social engineering in Johannesburg
which precipitated the removal for the entire Western Areas in 1955.
It is evident that both Verwoerd and the Council intended to use the
Newclare squatter settlement as the testing ground for the initial
implementation of removal on a grand scale and part of the envisaged
segregation of Johannesburg. Despite the collusion, however,
relations between these two protagonists were not always cordial or
co-operative. Each vied for its own workable strategy for the
removal of the the Newclare squatters. It is nevertheless contended
that the Council bowed to the reactionary programme devised by
Verwoerd and NAD, primarily because of its dependence upon government
funding for African housing within the municipality. Verwoerd's
threats to withhold finances persuaded the Council to acquiesce in
the Nationalist Government's removal plan.
Such material considerations also proved effective again when
the Council finally agreed to co-operate with the Natives
Resettlement Board, created to help implement the Western Areas
removal scheme from 1954 onwards.
Thus, the complex network of Russian Activity, police vascillation
and ineptitude as well as Council complicity with NAD chartered the
course towards the removal of the Newclare squatters, which in turn,
added momentum to the evolution of a wider removal scheme for the
entire Western Areas of Johannesburg.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN FAMILIES ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION
AND TOWNSHIP:
OCCUPATION
LABOURER
WASHERWOMAN
DOMESTICS
FACTCRY WORKER
CRAFTSMEN
TRANSPORT WORKER
POLICE/NIGHT
WATCHMEN
PROFFESSIONAL/
CLERK
ITINERANT TRADER
FIXED TRADER
HOUSEWIFE
PENSIONER
OTHER
UNEMPLOYABLE
SOPHIATOWN
%
42
3
5
22
5
9
2
3
3
1
2
1
1
1
MARTINDALE
%
33
•3
5
26
4
13
2
4
3
1
3
1
1
1
NEWCLARE
%
55
2
3
21
4
4
3
2
1
1
2
0.5
1
0.5
EXACT UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURE WERE UNAVAILABLE AT THE TIME OF WRITING
UP THE SURVEY REPORT IN 1950. FIGURES DID REVEAL THOUGH THAT
ONE IN EVERY TWENTY HEADS Or FAMILIES WAS UNEMPLOYED. (SURVEY P.44)
TABLE II
FAMILY INCOMES UNDER 30 POUNDS IN SOPHIATOWN, MARTINDALE AND NEWCLARE
MONTHLY INCOME IN
POUNDS AND SHILINGS
UNDER 2.10
2. 10-UNDER 5.0
5.0
7.10
10.0
12.10
15.0
17.10
20.10
22.10
25.10
27.10
ALL INCOMES
UNDER 30.0
SOPHIATOWN/MARTINDALE
% OF ALL AFRICAN
FAMILIES
1
2
4
14
25
14
10
5
5
3
3
1
87
NEWCLARE
% OF ALL AFRICAN
FAMILIES
3
1
7
18
26
10
9
4
3
2
1
1
85
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APPENDIX B
TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN FAMILIES IN THE WESTERN AREAS
ACCORDING TO TYPE OF TENANCY:
TOWNSHIP
SOPHT/MARTIND.
NEWCLARE
W • N. T.
ALL TOWNSHIPS
OWNER %
4
1
2
TENANT
80
82
87
82
SUB-TENANT %
16
17
13
16
TABLE II
NATURE OF DWELLINGS IN THE WESTERN AREAS:
CONSTRUCTION OF
DWELLING
IN ORDER/IN NEED
OF RECONSTRUCTION
NEEDING DEMOLITION
SOPHIATOWN
NO.
5 764
5 202
%
52
48
MARTINDALE
NO
1 100
1 017
%
52
48
NEWCLARE
NO.
1 887
2 722
%
41
59
APPENDIX C
TABLE I
THE AFRICAN MALE AND FEMALE POPULATION OF THE WESTERN AREAS
PERSONS
NO.
NO.
ALL
NO.I
ETHN
MALES
FEMALES
PERSONS
N ALL
IC GROUPS
SOPH
MART
21
17
39
44
IATOWN/
INDALE
317
869
186
096
NEWCLARE
7 452
7 109
14 561
16 985
• WESTERN NATIVE
TOWNSHIP
6 202
6 228
12 830
13 341
ALL
34
31
66
74
975
606
577
422
TABLE II
DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN FAMILIES:
TOWNSHIP
SOPHIATOWN
MARTINDALE
NEWCLARE
W.N.T.
TOTAL
NO. OF AFRICAN FAMILIES FOUND
IN 1950
10 966
2 117
4 609
2 600
20 292
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TABLE III
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS ACCORDING TO
LANGUAGE GROUPS AND SEX, AS FOUND IN A SAMPLE OF 303 HOUSEHOLDS
THROUGHOUT THE WESTERN AREAS. 1951 SAMPLE SURVEY.
LANGUAGE
GROUPS
XHOSA
S. SOTHO
N. SOTHO
TSWANA
ZULU
SWAZI
SHANGAAN
VENDA
FOREIGN
FAMI
NO.
50
59
39
139
67
17
23
11
25
LIES
%
11
13
9
32
15
4
5
3
6
PERSONS
NO.
135
201
123
403
173
47
67
29
49
%
11
16
10
33
14
4
5
2
4
PERCENTAGE
MALE %
55
47
48
51
50
49
58
62
73
OF SEXES
FEMALE %
45
53
52
49
50
51
42
38
27
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ootriotes
1.. V. f. W a 11 e r B e n J a in i n, " I" hi e S t o r y t e 11 e r, " i n I l luminat ions ,
J o n a t hi a n C a p e (I.... c;t n d o n ) „ 13 7 0..
'A.. \ he J..eve 1. of deba te a t tl"ie Gabarone c o n f e r e n c e on '' Uu 11ure and
R e s i s t a n a e'' a f e w y e a r s a go s e e in e d t o r e I11 e c t a n i n a b i. 111 y t o g o
boyon c::l bl"ie o 1 d teKPHIS.
Addendum
1 he above paper is the first part of what was Intended as a three™
part ar gument. 1 n the secon d part, it was my in tent1on to con s ider
the story collection, Fools, in the light of Ndebele" s critical
writings, and, in particular, with regard to his notion of the
storyteller. His discursive preoccupations with narrative
p e r s p e c tive, s e n s i tive c hi a r a c t e r i s a 11 o n, the i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n
sub J ective process an d obJeat i ve condition s, the re 1 ationshxp between
t he p o 111 i c i s i n g i n t e 1 It. e c t u a 1 a n d p o p ular c u 1.1 u re, an d t hi e
involvement of n on -politicised aspects of social life in the momentum
towards a new society, are ail strongly present in his fictional work
as well, I intended particularly to dwell on Nclebele' s way of
drarna 11 s in g socia 1 tens ion s :in Af r ican town ships.
H o w e? v e r, 111 y m a i n c r i t i c a 1 p a i n t pi :.i c k :i n J;J u p o 1-1 c o m m e n t s l:i r i e f 1 y
made towards the end of this paper -was that literary culture in
S o u t l"i A f r i c:: a I") as an essen t :i.. a 11 y '' in i d dX. e o !. a s s " c::: |-i a r a c t er, a n d
privileges, in its focus on individual character, "middle class"
preoccupat:i..cins, 1 angua9e and perspect::i.ves. Ndel:ie 1 e does not escape
tl'ils bias of the medium, despite his sensitivity to some of 1 bs
dangers.
